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SUPREME COURT - STA TE OF NEW YORK 
DUTCHESS COUNTY 
Present: 




NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent. 
Justice. 
DECISION, ORDER & 
JUDGMENT 
Index No: 1732/2017 
The following papers were read on this Article 78 proceeding: 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
PETITION 
EXHIBITS 1 & 2 
ANSWER AND RETURN 
EXHIBITS 1-13 
REPLY AFFIDAVIT 
This is an Article 78 proceeding in which petitioner challenges the respondent New York 
State Board of Parole's ("board") March 1, 2017 determination denying him parole release. 
Petitioner was convicted after trial in 1993 of Manslaughter in the 1st Degree, Criminal Possession 
of a Weapon in the 2"d Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the 3rd Degree. He was 
sentenced to a term of eight and a third to 25 years on the manslaughter charge, 5-15 years on one 
weapons charge and two and a third to seven years on the other weapon charge. The sentences were 
ordered to run consecutively resulting in an aggregate term of imprisonment of 15 and two third 
years to 47 years. His crimes of conviction stem from an incident in which he returned to the scene 
of an altercation with a nine millimeter semi-automatic pistol and in an ensuing gun battle shot and 
killed his victim. It was petitioner's first felony conviction but he had a prior juvenile adjudication 
from an incident in which he stabbed and killed a 62 year old woman during a burglary and a 1989 
misdemeanor assault conviction. Petitioner made his fifth appearance before the parole board on 
, 
March 1, 2017. He appealed the board's denial of release and the appeals unit affirmed. This 
proceeding followed. 
Petitioner claims that in denying parole release the board failed to consider all applicable 
statutory factors, gave undue weight to the crime of conviction, considered factors it was not 
permitted to consider under the Executive Law, relied on erroneous information in his COMP AS 
report, failed to consider his youth as a mitigating factor and failed to state the reasons for denial in 
detail. 
Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c), the New York State Board of Parole is required to 
consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released to parole. 
See Matter of Miller v. NYS Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690 (2nd Dept. 2010). The parole board must 
also consider whether "there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live 
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the 
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for 
the law.,, 9 NYCRR 8002. 1. A parole board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory 
factor, nor is it required specifically to articulate every factor considered. See Matter of Huntley v. 
Evans, 77 AD3d 945 (2°d Dept. 2010). It is further permitted to place a greater emphasis on the 
gravity of offense committed. See Matter of Serrano v. Alexander, 70 AD3d 1099, 1100 (3ro Dept. 
20 I 0). However, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, a parole board may not deny release 
solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense. Huntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d at 947; King v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1 51 Dept. 1993). Moreover, while the board need 
not consider each guideline separately and has broad discretion to consider the importance of each 
factor, the board must still consider the guidelines. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a). Finally, the board 
must inform the inmate in writing of the factors and reasons for denial of parole and"[ s ]uch reasons 
shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms." Executive Law §259-i(2)(a); Malone v: Evans, 
83 AD3d 719 (2"d Dept. 2011). A determination by a parole board whether or not to grant parole is 
discretionary, and if made in accordance with the relevant statutory factors, is not subject to judicial 
review absent "a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety." Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd. 
of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980). 
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended in 2011 to require the board to establish new 
procedures to use in making parole determinations. The statutory amendment was intended to have 
parole boards focus on an applicant's rehabilitation and future rather than giving undue weight to 
the crime of conviction and the inmate's pre-incarceration behavior. To assist the members of the 
board in taking this approach when making parole determinations, the amendment required the 
establishment of written guidelines incorporating risk and needs principles to measure an inmate's 
rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release. See Ramfrez v. Evans, -AD3d-, 2014 WL 
2504724 (2"d Dept., June 4, 2014). In response, the board of parole adopted the COMPAS 
(Correctional Offonder Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction) assessment tool. A 
COMP AS assessment was prepared in connection with petitioner's March 1, 2017 appearance before 
the parole board. 
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At petitioner's parole hearing, the board questioned him about his crimes of conviction, his 
juvenile adjudication, how his upbringing impacted his criminal history, his marriage, a positive 
behavioral change while incarcerated as well as discussed his plans for release, institutional 
achievements and prison disciplinary history. Petitioner spoke at length about how his 
disadvantaged childhood resulted in him engaging in criminal behavior. Petitioner further 
acknowledged that he had a significant disciplinary record while incarcerated but that at some point 
made a conscious decision to change his behavior. The board acknowledged that petitioner had 
"turned a corner" and that his COMP AS assessment found him to be a low risk of felony violence, 
re-arrest or absconding. The board further acknowledged that petitioner had made productive use 
of his leisure time, pursued educational and employment opportunities while incarcerated and 
petitioner's family ties but denied parole release finding that elements of petitioner's youth continued 
to plague him. The board recommended that he avail himself of resources available to him. The 
board's decision further stated that it considered the requisite statutory factors including his 
institutional adjustment, discipline and program participation, risk needs assessment and needs for 
successful re-entry into the community. Ultimately, however, the board found more compelling his 
crimes of incarceration and determined that if released there was a reasonable probability that 
petitioner would not live and remain at liberty and that his release would be incompatible with the 
welfare and safety of society. 
Based on the above, the court is without a basis to find that the board failed to consider the 
requisite statutory factors or gave undue weight to petitioner's crimes of conviction. The minutes 
of the parole hearing make clear that the board adequately considered the relevant statutory factors 
including his COMP AS re-entry risk assessment. While there may have been minor errors in the 
COMP AS assessment that erroneously stated petitioner had two prior felony assault offenses and 
one prior adult weapons offense, the court does not find these errors warrant vacatur of the parole 
board's determination. The parole board expressly acknowledged that petitioner's COMPAS 
assessment overall did not find him to be a high risk for a recidivism. Moreover, the board's 
comments at the hearing reflect that it was aware that petitioner is currently incarcerated for his first 
felony conviction and that he had a prior juvenile adjudication, not a felony conviction. The 
erroneous information as to petitioner's age when he was first arrested was not prejudicial to 
petitioner. The record further supports the indication that petitioner had a notable disciplinary record 
while incarcerated as the board express! y referenced an array of Tier III infractions while noting that 
petitioner's last disciplinary infraction was in 2013 . The court further rejects petitioner's claim that 
comments of board members demonstrate that it improperly considered factors outside of the 
Executive Law. The court has reviewed such comments and found that they were part of a dialogue 
with petitioner and an attempt to provide guidance as to a behavior that could benefit his chances 
for parole release. Nothing therein indicates that the board imposed a higher standard for petitioner's 
release than authorized by law. 
Petitioner's reliance upon the constitutional requirement that a parol board consider the 
significance of an inmate's youth and attendant circumstances at the time of the commission of a 
crime before making a parole determination is misplaced. See generally, Hawkins v NYS 
Department of Corrections and Comrnunitv Supervision, 140 AD3d 34 (3'd Dep't 2016). This 
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requirement applies to parole considerations for juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole 
for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment. See Montgomery v Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). Petitioner is not currently 
incarcerated for a crime committed when he was a juvenile and thus his current sentence does not 
implicate the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the parole board's written decision adequately sets forth 
the reasons for the denial of parole and thus complies with Executive Law §259-i (2)(a). 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the petition is denied. 
This constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the court. 
Dated: October 11', 2017 
Poughkeepsie, New York 
Reginald Peterson DIN#92A5540 
Otisville Correctional Facility 
PO Box 8 
Otisville, NYl 0963 
State of New York 
Office of the Attorney General 
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 401 
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601-3157 
ENTER: 
MARIA G. ROSA, J.S.C. 
Pursuant to CPLR §SS 13, an appeaJ as of right must be taken. within thirty days after service by a 
party upon the appellant of a copy of lhe judgment or order appealed from and written notice of 
its entry, except that when the appellant has served a copy of the judgment or order and written 
notice of its entry, the appeal must be taken within thirty days thereof. 
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